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Introduction
Welfare-oriented analyses of economic outcome measures such as income and wealth generally rest on the assumption that household resources are pooled and shared equally among its members; or in a wider definition, that all individuals have equal control over these resources. Yet some studies have demonstrated that household and individual welfare are not the same (e.g., Phipps & Burton 1995) , while the lack of individual-level data consistently hampers investigation of the income and wealth distribution within the household. The inability to differentiate asset ownership within the household forces many wealth studies to focus on differences in family structures (see, e.g., Zagorsky (1999) , Yamokoski & Keister (2006) , Schmidt and Sevak (2006) , Sedo & Kossoudji (2004) ).
Due to the lack of the appropriate individual wealth data, empirical papers often rely on the implicit assumption of equally sharing wealth across members of the same households. This paper challenges this approach by considering an alternative definition of the aggregation unit and by controlling its effect on distribution and inequality analysis (including the decomposition of inequality). We use the unique individual level wealth data of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) study and examine the existence of a gender wealth gap throughout the wealth distribution. Frick, Grabka, and Sierminska (2007) provide empirical evidence on the extent to which the implicit household internal wealth redistribution masks the -true‖ degree of inequality within households: using households as the aggregation unit and applying per-capita household wealth to all household members yields a Gini coefficient for net worth of about .70, which is about 8% less than that obtained from individual wealth information (.76). For a more top-sensitive inequality measure like the halfsquared coefficient of variation, the reduction is much stronger: about 25%.
In this paper, we use the semiparametric decomposition approach devised by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) to document disparities in individual wealth that exist between the sexes. To assess the sensitivity of our results, we compare them to those obtained using the decompositions developed by Oaxaca and Blinder (Oaxaca 1973; Blinder 1973) as well as by Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) . While our focus is on differentials within the household, we also document differences among other family types and by marital status (married, cohabiting, never married, widowed, and divorced) (see also Zagorsky 1999) . Descriptive analyses provide evidence for a significant -raw‖ gender wealth gap in Germany of approximately 30,000 euros, which widens to about 50,000 euros for men and women living 3 in couple-headed households. Among married households, we find that only 15% of these declare an even distribution of assets, thus giving strong support for the need to collect and analyze wealth at the individual level. This paper is organized as follows: Focusing on gender-specific aspects, Section 2 provides background information on wealth accumulation and reviews the relevant literature.
Data and decomposition methods are described in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Section 5 gives the empirical results of the wealth decomposition. Section 6 concludes by pointing to open research questions.
Background information: Wealth accumulation and empirical evidence
Differences in wealth accumulation
In a simple model of accumulation, assets in period t+1   In this model, the assets in period t+1 may be different for several reasons. First, of all differences in saving   t t C Y  will result in a different accumulation of assets. The amount saved will in turn depend on the level of income, age and risk-aversion. For example, households with the same saving rate will have different outcomes if their saving patterns are based on different levels of income. Younger households are also expected to have accumulated less wealth (Modigliani and Brumberg (1954); Friedman (1957) ) due to their different position in the life-cycle compared to the elderly. The presence of risk aversion will affects precautionary saving levels (Kimball (1990) ; Zeldes (1989) ). Due to uncertainty about future income and in case of liquidity constraints that prevent a household from borrowing, risk-averse households are expected to accumulate additional wealth in order to prevent a future drop in consumption caused by a negative income shock. As a result, households may differ in saving rates depending on their preferences and current consumption needs in the presence of liquidity constraints.
In addition, households differ in their preference for risk, which translates to different rates of return based on their preferred portfolio allocations. Via   r in equation (1) 
Gender differences in wealth accumulation
Any persistent differences between women and men in the aforementioned factors will lead to gender differences in wealth accumulation. Empirical evidence indicates gender differences in many areas.
First of all, women and men differ in their attachment to the labor market. According to Warren et al. 2001 any disadvantage in net worth is partly the result of lower female labor force participation The standard pattern is a continuous full-time labor market attachment for male breadwinners, while women tend to have part-time work arrangements (including potential wage penalties; see Bardasi and Gornick, 2008) , often with more diversified work histories due to child bearing and child rearing and more frequent job changes (Berger and Denton, 2004) .
Differences in earnings are another potential source of the wealth gap. Given a persistent gender gap in earnings, even when holding savings rates constant, women are expected to accumulate lower levels of wealth Kahn (1997, 2000) O'Neill (2003) Moore and Shierholz (2004) ).
There is evidence that women and men differ in the risk preference and hence, returns to savings as women invest more conservatively in their portfolios, which leads us to expect lower returns to wealth (Bajtelsmit and Van Derhei (1997) , Hinz, McCarthy and Turner (1997) , Jiankokopolos and Bernasek (1998) ). Also Brush et al. (2002) find that a relative lack of social networks reduces women's access to venture capital, thus leaving them out of this particular avenue of wealth creation.
Authors have also extensively pointed out differences between women and men in the probability of owning a home. This is the most important component of the household wealth portfolio, additionally providing a flow of services and opportunities to accumulate wealth.
One of the factors leading to gender differences in homeownership is discrimination in mortgage lending. Ladd (1998) found evidence of discrimination prior to the 1974 Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) in explicit bank policies. More recently, Robinson (2002) 5 found that gender and family structure discrimination depends on race. In the US, white couples face discrimination if the wife works, while African American couples face discrimination if the wife stays at home. These patterns also hold for households with a single female household head. White single mothers are at a relative disadvantage, while single African American mothers appear to be helped by the presence of children. The second barrier to homeownership for women is that women earn less than men on average and higher incomes are associated with an increased ability to save and with higher credit scores.
Differences in family structures have been found to be important in explaining the gender wealth gap. For example, Sedo and Kossoudji (2004) find that married households are significantly more likely to own a home than non-married couple-headed households and other households [there may be an endogeneity problem here, since married individuals may exhibit characteristics similar to those of individuals who invest in owner-occupied housing].
They also find that family type is associated with further differences than just gender. Women are more likely than men to live in single-earner households with children (the majority of single parents are women) and are thus less likely to be wealthy. Schmidt and Sevak (2006) find large differences in observed wealth between single households and married coupleheaded households throughout the wealth distribution. They also find that single women hold significantly less wealth than single men. Using the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition they find that a significant portion of the wealth gap remains unexplained. They cannot identify wealth gaps by gender and family type for younger individuals (25-39 years old) and suggest that these emerge later in life. Mohanty (2004) examines wealth holdings after divorce using PSID data for the 1990s. She finds that single females hold significantly lower levels of wealth than single males. In this case, child support has a positive effect on women's wealth after a divorce-after controlling for the economic and personal characteristics of her household. Levine, Mitchell, and Moore (2000) look at older households and find that non-married households are considerably less well-off than married couples, even after controlling for differences in household size. Using the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in the years before retirement, they also find sizeable gender gaps in both current and projected retirement income. Lupton and Smith (2003) also use the HRS to analyze the relationship between household type and asset accumulation, and also find that married households have more than twice the net worth of other types of households.
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Differences in marriage patterns among women and men also are found to make a difference in wealth accumulation. In a study by Wedgwood (1939) , it was argued that the most important determinants for wealth endowments of women are marriage and inheritances, and this was confirmed by (Harbury and Hitchens 1977) . In a more recent study, Zagorsky (1999) also finds that differences in wealth holdings are strongly affected by marital status.
She finds that among the baby boomers (born between 1957 and 1964) women hold more assets on average than men. However, among unmarried households, men hold greater assets than women, while the household assets of married women tend to be greater than the household assets of married men. She explains this on the basis of gender differences in marriage patterns. Since women tend to marry men who are a few years older (Gibson, Le and Scobie (2006) ), their households have had several additional years in which to accumulate wealth (including possible inheritances, which may also have a gender bias).
When looking at gender differences in wealth, some studies compare men and women in one-person households only, because surveys typically collect wealth information at the household level only. Other studies focus on individual wealth components, where data such as pension wealth is available at the individual level (see Warren 2006) . In many of the studies mentioned above, a major problem is that datasets on household wealth cannot assign asset ownership to one or the other spouse. Consequently, there has been little attempt to decompose wealth differentials by gender and there is not much that can be said about the financial well-being of married women (with respect to wealth holdings) although feminist economics emphasizes the importance of looking at intra-household inequality (Blumberg (1988) ; Haddad and Kanbur (1990) ; Phipps and Burton (1994) ; Sen (1990) and Woolley (1993) , Pahl (2001) , Allmendinger et al. (2006) , Deere and Doss (2006) ). One of the rare studies at the individual level is by Bolin and Pålsson (2001) , utilizing wealth data for Sweden and examining the importance of family structure on wealth accumulation. They find that cohabiting and married women are compensated for lost opportunities in the labor market by larger shares of the family's non-human wealth being assigned to them.
When looking at the different levels of wealth accumulation between men and women in general and within married couples in particular, one should also consider the institutional and legal environment providing the setting for accumulation. A good example is divorce law, which can significantly affect the net worth of a former marriage. As such it is important to note that the legal regulations in Germany and many other European countries consider joint ownership of assets (and debts) only for those wealth components acquired during marriage.
Wealth accumulated prior to marriage will remain in the hands of the original owner and will not be affected by a divorce. Inheritances during marriage are also not considered to be accumulated jointly and thus will remain fully in the hands of the successor. However, this is true for the (monetary value) of the original inheritance only and excludes capital gain or added value. Marriage contracts can also be designed to deviate from these standard regulations in divorce law. Thus, to test the actual equal sharing of resources within the family it is important to know which partner has the factual command over wealth given that in case of a divorce only the jointly accumulated wealth will be evenly split among the partners.
In this paper we have the unique opportunity to examine this aspect of household behavior by having individual ownership information of various subcomponents of wealth within households using the 2002 wealth module of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
Data
The Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) is a representative longitudinal survey of individuals living in private households in Germany (Wagner et al. 2007 ). The survey was started in 1984 in West Germany and was extended to East Germany in 1990. The initial sample included over 12,000 respondents, with everyone aged 17 and over in sample households being interviewed. In the years 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2006, new Potential shortcomings of this rather comprehensive questionnaire arise from the exclusion of cars in the measure of tangible assets and the lack of information about pension entitlements both from company pensions and from the statutory social pension fund in Germany (-Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung‖). The latter information is difficult to obtain through surveys because entitlements from these two security systems are not well known. A further restriction comes from the use of a lower threshold of 2,500 euros for financial and tangible assets and for consumer credits. This was introduced to reduce the burden on respondents by not asking them to state (rather) negligible amounts. As such, the overall measure of total wealth and the share of wealth holders are likely to be somewhat understated and biased against very small wealth holdings. A further restriction of the SOEP 2002 wealth questionnaire arises due to the lack of wealth information on children. SOEP collects wealth information from respondents starting at the age of 17. Thus any wealth held by younger persons is not considered here-although it may have been captured if a household-based questionnaire was used. In any case, given the minor relevance of wealth holdings by children this aspect can be neglected.
A more serious problem in collecting (representative) wealth data at the micro-level is measurement error from various sources such as rounding, misreporting and very likely underreporting (e.g., financial assets), and particularly because of non-response (see, e.g., Riphahn & Serfling 2005) . On the one hand, asking separately all adult household members instead of just one reference member may increase the probability of getting all wealth components of all household members, as well as a better estimate of the true wealth of each individual. On the other hand, however, this also increases the probability of inconsistent information (e.g., two partners providing non-matching information on the very same issue such as a commonly owned home). With respect to missing information due to item nonresponse on wealth questions, the non-participation of a household reference person results in completely missing data, while the non-participation of one individual results only in partially missing data. Nevertheless, coping with all these measurement problems is a major task. In case of the SOEP wealth data used here, inconsistencies have been taken care of by means of editing on a case-wise basis, while missing data due to item non-response as well as partial unit non-response (i.e., non-responding individuals in otherwise responding households) have been corrected for by multiple imputation techniques, explicitly considering the potential selectivity of the underlying missing mechanisms.
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Despite these shortcomings and empirical problems, when the total wealth of private households measured by SOEP 2002 is compared to corresponding aggregated information from national balance sheets, the survey does quite well (see Frick, Grabka and Sierminska (2007) ). Housing wealth components match very well as do net business assets. The biggest discrepancy is for the more heterogeneous categories financial assets and tangible assets, but in these two cases the questions ask to only report balances over 2500 euros and, more relevant, do not refer to all the components found in the aggregates included in the national balance sheets. The overall value of -financial assets‖ owned by a given person might consist of numerous single items and forgetting one of those yields a higher probability of understating the true value. This is less likely in the case of housing wealth, given that most people will not hold more than one home. Nevertheless, the coverage of financial assets as a percent of national balance sheet aggregates is as high as 50% (see Frick, Grabka, and Marcus 2007) , which is a very good result when compared to other surveys contained in the Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS) besides the SOEP (see http://www.lisproject.org/lwstechdoc.htm and Sierminska, Brandolini and Smeeding (2006)).
Methods
After providing more descriptive information and bivariate analyses on wealth endowments and inequality by gender and marital status (see Section 5 below) we will invest in a gender decomposition concentrating on males and females living in partnerships (married or cohabiting).
2 For sensitivity purposes we will apply various decomposition techniques, as each of them exhibits certain strengths and weaknesses.
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
We first use the Blinder-Oaxaca method to decompose the mean difference of wealth between men and women into portions attributable to differences in the distribution of endowments (explanatory variables) and differences in returns to these endowments 10 (coefficients, conditional expectation functions) (see Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973) . While this method is a very popular decomposition technique, it requires a parametric assumption to be made about the form of the conditional expectation function. This assumption often leads to misspecification error because it incorrectly captures the relationship between the dependent and the explanatory variables for the two groups to be differentiated (here: gender). It is thus likely to result in biased inferences regarding the portion attributable to differences in the distribution of explanatory variables (Barsky et al. 2001 ) particularly if the range over which the explanatory variables are defined differs for the groups under consideration. We test the extent to which this is the case in our sample of individuals living in marriage or cohabiting by alternatively specifying two reference groups.
The general specification for the Oaxaca decomposition is the following:
The first component captures differences due to characteristics, the second due to coefficients (estimated effects) and the third term is the interaction between coefficients and endowments. A discussion of alternative decomposition equations distinguishing different reference groups can be found in appendix A.1.
The Juhn, Murphy, & Pierce decomposition
The Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (JMP) (1993) decomposition method extends the Oaxaca decomposition by taking into account the residual distribution. The innovation in the JMP extension is to decompose the -unexplained‖ or -residual‖ portion of the gap from the Oaxaca decomposition into price and quantity components. In other words, this technique maintains the component of Oaxaca's decomposition which captures the wealth differential due to the differences in characteristics (endowments), but the second component (due to differences in coefficients) is divided into two effects: one reflects the wealth differential attributable to the respective mean percentile ranks (interpreted as the level of unobserved ability) and the second part captures the differential due to wealth dispersion (interpreted as ability prices or individual characteristic prices), which in this case we could interpret as differences in the wealth function (-discrimination‖). (More technical details on the JMP method can be found in Appendix A.2.).
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One should be careful when interpreting these components. The components used as an indicator of the level of unobserved abilities could be due as much to an unobserved characteristic as to the simple omission of explanatory variables. Second, as we are making reference to gender discrimination, this component could reflect the unobservable part of discrimination itself 3 .
Nonparametric Methods for Group Comparisons
In order to avoid making an assumption about the functional form of the conditional expected wealth function we make use of a decomposition technique introduced by DiNardo, Fortin, Lemieux (1996) and used, for example, by Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand (2006) . The idea is to use reweighting techniques to identify various counterfactual distributions that allow us to determine the contribution of specific components to the overall gap. In this case, we partition the vector of wealth determinants into four groups: (1) labor market experience, (2) education level, (3) intergenerational characteristics, and (4) The specification of the wealth gap as a function of the four groups of variables can be written in the following way:
The first component captures the effect of differences in labor market experience distribution on the gender wealth gap; the second component captures the effect of differences between men and women with respect to education; the third effect results from differences in 12 intergenerational characteristics; and the fourth effect from demographic differences. The last term refers to the differences between the conditional wealth functions for men and women.
(A detailed discussion of the construction of counterfactuals is in Appendix A.3.) Whereas the decomposition following the Blinder-Oaxaca approach focuses on the mean counterfactual, this nonparametric approach examines the distributional counterfactual. The nonparametric approach also allows researchers to avoid making parametric assumptions, which is also important when one is interested in looking at the whole distribution.
Finally, we compare our results obtained from the three different decomposition methods and examine the value added as well as the cross-technique consistency of the respective results.
Results
Descriptive Findings
In the following section, we investigate gender differences in wealth holdings for adults (17 years and older) only, explicitly considering the composition of the person's household. Basic non-wealth characteristics can be found in Table 1 , separately for gender and split by marital status. The rationale for explicitly contrasting these non-wealth characteristics by gender is simply that a possible gender wealth gap may result from differential endowment with certain characteristics rather than from gender per se. This will also be crucial to the gender decomposition analysis that follows.
The women in the sample are slightly older, both overall and in most of the marital status subgroups except married and cohabiting. This reflects that among German couples, men still tend to be about three years older on average than their female partners. Men have higher individual labor income in all groups, but particularly divorced and widowed men.
About 7 percentage points more men than women obtained higher education. Among married couples this difference increases to ten percent. Men are more likely to be employed full-time and to be self-employed. Women, on the other hand, are more likely to be employed part-time (13.5% versus 2% for men) or not employed (42.5% versus 25.7 % for men). This employment gap is much more pronounced for married than for cohabiting women. All of these findings can be taken as indications of continued conservative marriage behavior among men and women, confirming the typical pattern of the male-breadwinner model within 13 German couples: on average, men are married to younger, less-educated women who work less than full-time, but who-given the relatively low German inheritance taxes-eventually profit from their late husband's wealth accumulation. Strikingly, even in the group of individuals who have never been married, women are less likely to be employed full-time (29.4% versus 37.4% for men) and not employed (13.3% versus 6.6%), although there are no substantial differences in education and income. Finally, more women than men recently received an inheritance, but their inheritances are also lower than men's. Table 2 summarizes wealth holdings among men and women differentiated by marital status. On average, men hold about 30,000 euros more than women. This gap is about 9,000 euros when we look at the median and is present in all household types defined by marital status. Figure 1 presents net worth measures by gender and marital status including 95% confidence bands: it is only among the widowed and never-married singles that we do not find significant gender wealth gaps. Interestingly, German widows are the wealthiest group among all women, perhaps profiting from the aforementioned inheritance regulations and their longer life expectancy. On the other hand, looking at those currently married, the wealth gap is particularly large with about 47,000 euros. This may come as a surprise: we would expect a more even split among people -sharing their lives.‖ Actually, a substantial part of welfare-oriented research relies on the assumption of pooling and equal sharing of resources, an assumption that is driven by the lack of appropriate data, among other things. The availability of individual microdata in the German SOEP provides us with a unique opportunity to compare individual and aggregated wealth information and thus to examine whether the equal sharing assumption is adequately reflected in the data.
In the following, our analysis focuses on individuals living in marriages or cohabiting partnerships. The wealth variable we use is net worth, which consists of wealth bound in principal residence, other property, financial assets, insurance and private pensions, business assets, tangible assets, and debt. Net worth is top-coded at the 99 th percentile (at 925,000 euros) and bottom-coded at the 1 st percentile (at -100,000 euros). After establishing some descriptive facts about the wealth gap, we move on to disclose some reasons for these differences including wealth decomposition by gender, based on the methodologies described above.
Some Facts about "Equal Sharing" among Couples in Germany
The extent to which we observe equal sharing among married and cohabiting couples In Table 3a we find the breakdown of the different types of -sharing couple-headed households‖ by wealth quantiles. Only about 15% of couples experience equal sharing within their households. In 26% of households, the woman reports holding more wealth than the male counterpart and in nearly 50% percent of the couple-headed households, men report holding more wealth. There are no substantial differences in this reporting across the wealth distribution. The -male-in-charge‖ type of household is on average equally present in the 2 nd to the 5 th quantile. In the bottom wealth quantile, only 20% of the households are of this type, but this result is driven by the inclusion of couples with no wealth (47% of those in the lowest quintile or 10% of the population in couple-headed households).
The average wealth gap, i.e., the absolute difference in wealth holdings by men and women, is 27,967 euros in favor of men (Table 3b ). An average gap of this magnitude or larger can be found in households in the top two quantiles of the wealth distribution while in the bottom three quantiles the gap is much lower. In households of the -men-in-charge‖ type, the gap is about 30% larger than the respective gap in female-in-charge type of households.
This results from the fact that men on average hold more assets in each of the wealth quantiles than their respective female counterpart. In other words, men in female-in-charge households will hold more assets then their female counterpart in male-in-charge households (Table 3c and 3d). The one exception is the bottom quantile of the distribution.
In order to determine the driving forces behind this phenomenon, we considered various hypotheses. First, we compared the portfolio composition between men and women.
A summary of the differences is provided in Table 4 . We find that among the married and cohabiting group, men on average hold more wealth of each of the components, but there is a particularly large difference for business assets (Edland & Kopczuk 2007) . The higher prevalence of self-employed males has already been identified in Table 1 .
The disparities in the value of owner-occupied homes appear to be less pronounced for married 5 and cohabiting couples (Table 4) compared to other components of the wealth portfolio. In fact, homeownership seems to exert an equalizing effect given that it is most prevalent among the -equal sharing‖ households in general (two-thirds of those observations live in owner-occupied housing) as well as in almost every quintile of the wealth distribution (Table 3e ).
Decomposing the Wealth Gap
In the following section, we apply three different methods to decompose the gender wealth gap. It must be noted that in this paper, we do not compare men and women within the very same partnership or marriage but rather look at all married or cohabiting men and women, respectively. Nevertheless, this analysis is thought of as a first necessary step towards an investigation of the true intra-partnership wealth distribution.
The standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition concentrates on the mean of the variable of interest. Although easy to interpret, the disadvantage of this method is that it requires the assumption of a linear specification, which may bias the decomposition results. For this reason, second, we apply the decomposition method proposed by Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) , which allows us to analyze the gender wealth gap at different points of the distribution. Third, to examine whether factors like labor market experience, educational level, and intergenerational and demographic characteristics affect the dispersion, we adopt the methods presented by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) .
Net worth for women and men
The results presented above suggest that the average wealth difference of about 28,000 euros in households with couples can be explained by many covariates, but only to a certain extent. We examine the effect of these covariates by using regression analysis for women and men separately (see Table 5 ) 6 . According to these results, once we control for the length of marriage, only full-time labor market experience and permanent income have a significantly different effect for men and women in couple-headed households on the currently accumulated stock of net worth. Controlling for the length of marriage also reverses the magnitude between men and women of the variable indicating having a mother with higher education. Nevertheless, the effect of having a father with higher education remains significantly different for men and women with the effect on women's accumulated wealth being five times stronger than for men. The rest of the covariates have the expected effect.
The number of marriages, being an immigrant and having lived in East Germany before 1989 exert a significantly negative effect on net worth. While having high education, being over 65
and having high job autonomy has a positive effect. Having received an inheritance has a significant and strong effect on wealth for both men and women. Finally, it should be noted that-conditional on the choice of covariates-the overall explanatory power of our model is much greater for men than for women: the R-squared of the estimation for men is 29% vs.
only 18% in the model for women.
The Blinder-Oaxaca method
We now turn to the analysis of the gender wealth gap using the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition approach. The wealth gap between male and female partners depends on three factors: differences in observable characteristics (e.g., education, number of children, life work experience, health, immigrant status, education of parents, inheritance), differences in coefficients across the two groups (e.g., differences in how the characteristics translate into wealth based on the wealth function), and unobservables. Table 6 presents two different sets of results. In the top part of the table, the results treat women as the reference group and in the bottom men are the reference group. In other words, the mean outcome difference can be expressed in the following way:
where women are the reference group; and
where men are the reference group. Table 6 , close to 70% of the gap is explained by differences in characteristics between male and female partners. If women had the exact same characteristics as men, their average wealth would increase by about 20,000 euros to almost 100,000 euros.
Interestingly enough, if men's characteristics translated into wealth in the same way as women's characteristics do, the average wealth holdings of men would be 125,200 euros instead of 107,761 euros. This is an indication for women deriving -more wealth‖ from their own characteristics than they would be able to derive if they had the same parameters as men.
Examining the three-fold decomposition according to Blinder-Oaxaca ( Table 7 ) we find that in fact, women's wealth function (the differences in coefficients) compensates for the differences in characteristics almost entirely when the model for men is chosen as the nondiscriminatory model. This could not be seen in the two-fold decomposition. As shown in Table 7 , women's average wealth, if they had men's characteristics and wealth functions, would be 98 400 euros versus their actual 79,562 euros. The panel shows that although the gap can be decomposed into the portion explained by differences in characteristics and differences in coefficients, the unexplained portion (-Interaction‖ in Table 7 )-that can be interpreted as discrimination-is of similar magnitude to the wealth gap.
The Juhn-Murphy-Pierce method
The Blinder-Oaxaca method provided us with the mean outcome difference due to endowments, coefficients, and interactions between these two measures. In the method proposed by Juhn, Murphy, Pierce (1993) and also used by Blau and Kahn (1996) , two hypothetical wealth distribution functions are created that allow us to isolate the gender differences due to differences in characteristics, differences in the wealth function between men and women, as well as an unexplained portion that is due to unobservable skill between men and women together with the current market value of this unobservable skill measured by equation residuals (see Appendix A.2). We consider three alternative types of measures of these wealth distributions: first, the mean wealth gap that corresponds to the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition; second, the wealth gap at various percentiles of the distribution; and third, differences in wealth dispersion as measured by the wealth gap between various percentiles.
The results of the mean gap decomposition are given in Table 8 . Assuming the male group as the reference group (upper panel), we find that more than 45,000 euros of the gap is due to differences in characteristics suggesting that average women's wealth would exceed that of men's if they both had the same characteristics according to the JMP decomposition.
The negative sign on the -gap due to differences in coefficients‖, i.e., the way women translate their characteristics into wealth, suggests that this has a diminishing effect on the wealth gap. In this non-parametric decomposition method, the unexplained portion is quite small compared to the parametric Oaxaca-Blinder method. The bottom panel confirms the results.
Examining the wealth gap at different points in the distribution, we find, not surprisingly, that it increases as we move up the wealth distribution (see Table 9 ). It is 18,250 at the median and more then three times as large at the 90th percentile with almost 68,000 euros. Across the distribution, most of the gap stems from the differences in characteristics between men and women, rather than from differences in the way in which-conditional on their characteristics-men and women have accumulated their wealth in the past. Although wealth parameters do matter, particularly at the bottom of the distribution, with increasing wealth there is a distinct increase in the explanatory relevance of the difference in characteristics and a reduction in the role of the differences in the wealth function. The unexplained portion of the wealth also becomes smaller for the wealthier. For the bottom half of the distribution it has a reducing effect on the gap.
Looking at the 90-50 decile ratio (lower panel of Table 9 ), over half of the differences in wealth dispersion in the two distributions as measured by the wealth gap can be explained by differences in characteristics. As such, in the upper part of the distribution differences in characteristics exert an increasing effect on the wealth gap while according to the results for the 50-10 decile ratio these have a reducing effect on the gap. Over 50% of the gap also remains unexplained. The differences in the wealth function account for a sizeable part of the gap in the lower part of the wealth distribution. This might be interpreted in such a way that the gap among wealthy persons is driven by differences in characteristics between men and women whereas differences in wealth functions are more relevant among the less wealthy.
The DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux method
By using the DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux approach we avoid making any parametric assumptions about the distribution function and consider comparisons of the whole probability density function. We group the explanatory variables into four groups: (1) labor market experience, (2) education level, (3) intergenerational characteristics, and (4) demographic characteristics.
7 These factors correspond closely to the list of potential sources of wealth differences among men and women. Similarly to Cobb-Clark & Hildebrand (2006) and Gibson, Le, and Stillman (2007) , the results presented here are obtained by calculating all relevant counterfactuals and then taking the simple average over all possible decompositions.
The results for the raw wealth gap correspond to those presented for the JMP decomposition in Table 9 , although the decompositions according to DFL differ as they are done sequentially according to the four factor groups (Table 10) .
In many cases, the gap is the result of differences in current income and experience in the labor market and not as much related to the other characteristics such as education. The effect of labor market experience is found to be strong at the median and at the top of the distribution, whereas at the bottom of the wealth distribution education plays a somewhat stronger role. For most of the distribution, neither intergenerational nor demographic characteristics add significantly to the explanation of the gender wealth gap. However, a very large part of the gap results from the differences in how men and women have accumulated their wealth-conditional on their characteristics-i.e., differences in their wealth function, which is included in the -unexplained‖ column of Table 10 
Comparison of results derived from various decomposition techniques
Both the Oaxaca-Blinder and Juhn-Murphy-Pierce methods confirmed that the average wealth gap results from differences in characteristics between men and women and that the wealth gap would even have been marginally larger if the wealth function for the two groups had been identical. The way women accumulate wealth has a reducing effect on the gap. This was confirmed to be true across the wealth distribution (Table 9 ). In absolute terms, the unexplained portion of the gap rises as we move up the wealth distribution. In the DiNardo, Fortin, Lemieux method we specify the different factors that could help explain the differences in the wealth gap. Here we find that the observable characteristics play a large role in accounting for the gap (particularly individual income and labor market experience) which is consistent with the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce method only at the top of the distribution. In our analysis, we also check the robustness of the results by excluding the self-employed given that they also accumulate wealth to provide themselves security at a later age. We find our main results remain unchanged with magnitudes of the effects becoming smaller (results available from the authors). 
Conclusions
A main obstacle to the analysis of gender wealth gaps in the empirical literature is the lack of comprehensive wealth information at the individual level (Deere and Doss, 2006) .
This gap in the literature can be tackled using the 2002 wealth module of the German SOEP, which contains wealth data on about 23,000 individuals. We find clear empirical indications of a significant gender wealth gap of about 30,000 euros, which amounts to almost 50,000 euros for partners in married couples. We find that overall only about 15% of all couples have equal sharing within their households. In 26% of households, the woman reports having more wealth than her male partner and in nearly 50% men report more wealth.
Using various decomposition methods (Oaxaca-Blinder, Juhn-Murphy-Pierce, and DiNardo, Fortin, Lemieux) we find a robust picture of the wealth gap being mostly driven by differences in characteristics between men and women. By far the most important factor is the individual's own income and labor market experience particularly for the bottom and top of the wealth distribution. However, this finding can only be shown with the non-parametric JMP and DFL methods due to the mean-orientation of the parametric Oaxaca-Blinder technique. Differences for those in the middle of the distribution seem to appear to be mostly driven by the way women transform their characteristics into wealth, i.e., the wealth function.
Future research will have to focus more closely on wealth differentials between malefemale couples living in the same household. To shed more light on the intra-partnership wealth variation, we also need to control for gender-specific marriage patterns, and consequently, to analyze the wealth gap as a function of within-partnership variation with respect to age, education, income, employment status, etc. Such an approach, however, demands extensive microdata as well as the consideration of the institutional framework, especially in Germany with its well developed public pension system. As shown above, individual wealth holdings depend crucially on employment status: self-employed individuals who are not covered by the statutory public pension scheme have to invest in private old age provisions. Consequently, we find this group to be much better off in our wealth measure, which ignores an individual's public pension entitlements. Obviously, within partnerships, wealth holdings as well as plans for further accumulation will vary by both partner's employment status and consequently by whether or not a person is accumulating their own public pension entitlements. Due to the prominence of the male breadwinner model in Germany, the effect of considering individual pension entitlements on the intra-partnership wealth gap will very likely increase. The analyses and results presented in this paper based on financial and real assets may be seen as a first and necessary step towards achieving a more comprehensive understanding of the gender wealth gap. Note: Men as the reference group; values in parenthesis give the share of the wealth gap which can be attributed to differences in characteristics, differences in coefficients, and the unexplained part, respectively. Source: SOEP 2002. 
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Appendix A: The decomposition methods
All decomposition analyses in this paper were performed using Stata© (version 9.2). The procedures used are -OAXACA.DO‖, -JMPIERCE.DO‖ (by Ben Jann) and -DECOMPOSE2.DO‖ generously provided by Vincent Hildebrand for the DFL decomposition.
Appendix A.1: The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
is the conditional mean function for j=Woman, Man and j  -coefficients for j-group and j X characteristics of j group. In this three-fold decomposition, the first component expresses the composition effect in the gap that comes from the differences in the mean outcome based on characteristics X between group M and W, the second is the effect due to differences in coefficients (this is the estimated effects) between these two groups, and the third term is the interaction term of the two effects. It must be kept in mind that the estimated coefficient effect commonly known as -discrimination‖ will be incorrect if there are characteristics that affect the explanatory variable (in this case wealth), but have been omitted from the regression 9 -the so-called omitted variable problem. Others who believe that there is prevalent discrimination and that the magnitude of discrimination is greater than the coefficient effect itself argue that even differences in qualifications and credentials may be the result of pre-market discrimination-the so-called included variable problem.
Depending on which group (either M or W) we consider as the reference group, we can specify alternative two-fold decompositions: If we assume M to be the reference group (or the non-discriminatory group) or the group whose coefficient structure prevails (in our case, the wealth function), the -explained‖ part of the differential will be the sum of components I and III and the -unexplained‖ portion will be equal to component II.
An alternative decomposition of the group differential would be to specify W to be the reference, non-discriminatory group. Assuming that the coefficient structure from group W prevails, the -explained‖ part of the differential will be equal to component I and the -unexplained‖ component will be the sum of II and III. Next, let us assume (.) F to be the reference residual distribution (e.g., the average residual distribution over both samples) and  an estimate of benchmark coefficients (e.g., the coefficients from a pooled model over the whole sample). Using this framework, we can reconstruct hypothetical outcome distributions with any of the components held fixed. We can then determine 1. hypothetical outcomes with varying quantities between the groups and fixed prices (coefficients) and a fixed residual distribution as 
Where
T is the total difference; Q can be attributed to differences in observable quantities; P to differences in observable prices, and U to differences in unobservable quantities and prices. This last component not only captures the effect of unmeasured prices, and the effect of the differences in the distribution of unmeasured characteristics (e.g., one of the unmeasured characteristics is more important for men or women for generating wealth), but also measurement error (e.g., men and women report wealth differently).
The major advantage of the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce framework is that it allows us to look at how differences in characteristics affect the entire wealth distribution and not just the variance. We can identify how differences in the distribution affect other inequality measures or how the effects on inequality are different below and above the mean.
Appendix A.3: The DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux (DFL) decomposition
In their decomposition, DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux use a semiparametric decomposition approach and avoid making parametric assumptions about the conditional mean function. Instead they use reweighting techniques and consider comparisons of probability density functions such as in the case of differences in wealth between men and women: is the probability that a randomly selected individual with characteristics x belongs to group i if individuals from both groups are pooled in a common population and ) ( i j P  is the probability that a randomly selected individual belongs to group j in a pooled population. ) (w g j can be estimated using Kernel density estimators.
In this case the decomposition would be the following:
The second component would express differences due to characteristics and the first would capture the unobservables.
Another question we could ask is:
1. What would the wealth distribution of men be if they had the characteristics of women Since the ordering of these factor decompositions matters, we use all possible orderings and the presented results are averages across all orderings.
